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For Mr. Justice Brennan the law is a living reality concerned with human beings, rather than a series ofjudicial declarations embalmed in judicial opinions. His enthusiasm is
contagious and his ability to deal with judges and lawyers is
outstanding. While he is keenly conscious of the fact that we
live in a constantly changing world, he is equally aware of the
fact that human nature changes very little. He is, therefore,
instinctively inclined to preserve the essentials of all that is
good in the past and to adapt them to the needs of the times.'
The tenure of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. on the United
States Supreme Court spans almost three decades.' Though often a
dissenter, Justice Brennan is a recognized leader on the Court in
many substantive areas such as church-state relations,' rights of the
accused, 4 and first amendment guarantees. 5 His political acumen
has been noted, and the positions he has taken on several controversial issues have prevailed. Indeed, he has emerged as a "bridge
* B.A., LL.B., St. John's University; LL.M. New York University; Dean, Seton
Hall University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Robin D. Beam and
Barbara Birdsall, who assisted in the research of this article.
I Vanderbilt, Mr.Justice Brennan, in New Members of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 43 A.B.A.J. 526, 526 (1957).
2 Justice Brennan took his oath of office on October 16, 1956. McQuade &
Kardos, Mr. Justice Brennan and His Legal Philosophy, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw. 321, 321
(1958).
3 See, e.g., Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985) (shared
time and community education program held to advance religion, thereby violating
establishment clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (employee in South
Carolina can receive unemployment compensation benefits after being fired because of religious belief that prevented work on Saturdays).
4 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (probable cause necessary
for station house detention accompanied by interrogation even if no formal arrest
made); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (seizure of fingerprints disallowed
as product of unlawful detention under fourth and fourteenth amendments);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (after indictment, suspect has right to
counsel at pretrial confrontation such as lineup); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301 (1958) (articulated "Knock and Announce" rule prior to arrest).
5 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (procedural safeguards
necessary to protect first amendment rights in film licensing); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (established actual malice standard in defamation
actions dealing with public officials and media defendants); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963) (recognizing first amendment protection for associational right to
seek legal redress); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (ordinance establishing
strict liability for possession of obscene books violated first amendment).
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builder" between competing factions on the Court.6
This article will focus on several areas in which Justice Brennan
appears to have drawn upon his experiences as a New Jersey lawyer
and judge, such as the use of state constitutions and court management and reform. In addition, the article will examine two substantive areas-equal protection and federalism-that best illustrate the
leadership role Justice Brennan enjoys on the Court today.
I.

BIOGRAPHY

WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., the son of Irish-Catholic immigrants,
was born in Newark, New Jersey on April 25, 1906.' His father
came to NewJersey in 1893 from Roscommon, Ireland, where he
had been employed as a metal polisher and as a brewery worker.8
In Newark, the elder Brennan quickly identified with the expanding labor union movement, and he eventually served as a
member of the Essex County Trades and Labor Council. 9 Later
in his career, he served three terms as Director of Public Safety.1 °
The senior Brennan, who was widely known for his integrity and
honesty, served the public until his death in 1930 at the age of
57.11
William, Jr. attended both parochial and public schools in
Newark, worked part-time, and graduated from Barringer High
School. 12 In 1928, he graduated with honors from the Wharton
School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania, married Marjorie Leonard of East Orange, and entered
Harvard Law School.' 3 At the time of Brennan's graduation
from the Harvard Law School, Pitney, Hardin & Skinner, a leading Newark firm headed by James Pitney, the son ofJustice Mahlon Pitney, was searching for young talent to revitalize the firm.
In a stroke of foresight and judgment, the firm extended offers to
Brennan and Donald B. Kipp-both of whom would become future leaders of the bar in New Jersey.
In 1932, Brennan was admitted to the New Jersey Bar. He
6 Friedman, William J. Brennan, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2852 (L. Friedman

& F. Israel eds. 1980).
7 McQuade & Kardos, supra note 2, at 321.
8 Id.

9 Id. at 321-22.
10 Id. at 322.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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enthusiastically began to practice in New Jersey and soon gained
a reputation as an astute, disciplined attorney. 4 As a specialist in
labor law, Brennan represented management for such clients as
Western Electric, New Jersey Bell Telephone, Phelps Dodge, and
the Celanese Corporation.' 5 He became a partner at Pitney, Hardin & Skinner in 1937.16 With the outbreak of World War II,
Brennan entered the Army and served in Washington, D.C., as-7
sisting Secretary of War Robert B. Patterson in labor matters.
He was discharged from the service at the end of the war with the
rank of full colonel.' 8 He then returned to the Pitney firm, which
then became known as Pitney, Hardin, Ward & Brennan.' 9
During the period after the war, Brennan actively participated in the movement for judicial reform, and he was instrumental in effectuating the major changes embodied in the New
Jersey Constitution of 1947.2" The new constitution completely
reorganized New Jersey's court system. 2 ' Shortly thereafter, in
January of 1949, Republican Governor Alfred E. Driscoll appointed Brennan a judge of the Law Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court. 22 He was subsequently designated as Assignment Judge for Hudson County. 23 Widely recognized throughout the state as an excellent supervisor and manager, Judge
Brennan was appointed to the New Jersey Supreme Court's
Committee on Pre-Trial Conferences and Calendar Control.2 4 In
this capacity, he engineered several highly successful procedural
changes, which decreased docket congestion and minimized delays in the administration of justice.25 In 1950, Judge Brennan
was appointed to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, and in 1952, he was named to the New Jersey
Supreme Court.2 6
Four years later, on September 29, 1956, Justice William J.
Brennan was unexpectedly called to Washington, D.C. by Attor14 Id. at 323.
15 J. FRANK, THE WARREN COURT 117
16 McQuade & Kardos, supra note 2,

(1964); see Vanderbilt, supra note 1, at 526.
at 323.

17 Vanderbilt, supra note 1, at 526.

McQuade & Kardos, supra note 2, at 323.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See N.J. CONST. art. VI.
22 Vanderbilt, supra note 1, at 526.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 McQuade & Kardos, supra note 2, at 323-24.
26 Id. at 323.
18
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ney General Herbert Brownell.2 7 Republican President Dwight
D. Eisenhower had nominated Brennan, a lifelong Democrat, as
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 28 With
the exception of Senator Joseph McCarthy, public reaction was
virtually unanimous in favor of the appointment.2 9 New Jersey
Governor Robert B. Meyner commented: "[Brennan] is very able
indeed . . . a sound liberal of the highest personal character and
with great intellectual drive. . . . But I suspect his opinions will
not be quite as 'middle-of-the-road' as some Republicans seem to
think." 3 ° Bernard Shanley, a leading New Jersey attorney, described Brennan as "extraordinarily brilliant; he has a tremendous personality; and he is genuine from top to toe. "31 U.S. News
and World Report said: "In some decisions handed down by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, Justice Brennan has been outspoken
in defending the rights of citizens. As a lawyer, he advocated
compulsory arbitration in strikes against public utilities-a procedure that since has been written into New Jersey law. ' 3 2 Life magazine also praised the appointment:
Id. at 321.
Id. Brennan filled the "Roman Catholic Seat" that had been empty since the
death ofJustice Frank Murphy in 1949. Four other men had occupied the traditionally Catholic seat: Roger B. Taney, Edward D. White, Joseph McKenna, and Pierce
Butler. H. ABRAHAM,JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 62-64 (2d ed. 1985).
29 See McQuade & Kardos, supra note 2, at 324-26. Senator McCarthy voted
against Brennan's nomination based in part upon two speeches Brennan made
while still on the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. at 326. During the hearings on
Brennan's nomination, Senator McCarthy attempted to obtain Brennan's view of
the Senate's investigating committees on communism:
Senator MCCARTHY. . . . And, Mr. Brennan, just so there is no doubt
in your mind, I have been reading in the Daily Worker and in the - I
don't intimate that you are even remotely a Communist or anything like
that.
Mr. BRENNAN. I have never read a copy of it.
Senator MCCARTHY. I do. I read it. I have been reading in every leftwing paper, the same type of gobbledegook that I find in your speeches
talking about the barbarism of committees, the same Salem witch hunts.
Ijust wonder if a Supreme Court Justice can hide behind his robes and
conduct a guerilla warfare against investigating committees and you
talked about barbaric procedures.
Nomination of William Joseph Brennan,Jr.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (statement of WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., nominee, United
States Supreme Court), reprintedin 103 CONG. REC. 3945 (1957).
30 Krock, The Inspiring Background of the New Justice, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1956, at
34, col. 5.
31 Id.
32 An ExperiencedJudge for the Supreme Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12,
1956, at 70.
27
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Justice Brennan . . . brings to the Court one of the keenest,
quickest judicial minds in the country. The opinions he has
delivered in his seven years on the New Jersey Bench are clear,
forceful and middle-of-the-road. . . . Brennan has been
America's hardest working crusader for speedier trial procedure, having helped institute a pre-trial conference system that
reduced his state's huge backlog of court cases to the point
where it is now a national model.3 3
II.

JUSTICE BRENNAN AND JUDICIAL REFORM

Justice Brennan's interest in judicial efficiency and court
management might be traced in part to his participation in the
movement for judicial reform in NewJersey. 34 Perhaps his training at the Wharton School of Business was also influential in furthering this interest. During his legal career in New Jersey and
his early years on the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan authored
several articles and speeches on the various subjects relating to
court management and judicial efficiency. 3 5 In one article, he advocated the application of business principles to judicial administration.3 6 He referred to NewJersey's "integrated court system,"
which, in his view, was organized "much as a business corporation under rules of practice, procedure and administration devised by the Supreme Court as the Board of Directors, and
supervised by the Chief Justice as Executive Head, assisted by a
presiding judge in each county functioning much like the branch
'37
head of any far-flung business.
In 1973, Brennan stated that shortly after joining the United
States Supreme Court, he had adopted a policy of extrajudicial
silence because he had come "to appreciate the wisdom of some
of [his] distinguished predecessors who believed that a Justice of
the Supreme Court should speak only through his published
opinions. ' 38 Having acknowledged that policy of silence, BrenA Fine Judge Ready for His Biggest Job, LIFE, Oct. 29, 1956, at 115, 116.
For Justice Brennan's views on judicial efficiency, see Brennan, After Eight
Years. New JerseyJudicialReform, 43 A.B.A.J. 499 (1957); Brennan, PretrialProcedurein
NewJersey-A Demonstration, 28 N.Y. ST. B. BUL. 442 (1956); Brennan, The Congested
Calendars in Our Courts-The Problem Can Be Solved, 38 CHI. B. REC. 103 (1956).
35 See, e.g., supra note 34.
33

34

36

Brennan, Does Business Have a Role in Improving JudicialAdministration?, 28 PA.

B.A.Q. 238 (1957). Justice Brennan stated: "I have been preaching a long time to
all who will listen that the intelligent application of the principles of business management . . . will cure most of the problems of organization, processes and management which are plaguing the courts of our land." Id. at 238.
37 Id. at 241.
38 Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U.

CHi.

L. REv. 473,
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nan made an exception to it in an article opposing the creation of
a National Court of Appeals.3 9 That court was the controversial
recommendation of the Freund Committee, which was formed to
study the burgeoning workload of the United States Supreme
Court.4" The proposed court was to be composed of seven
United States circuit court judges who would screen cases for
Supreme Court review. 4
In contrast to Chief Justice Warren Burger's position that
creation of such a panel was not a radical departure from the
present system, Justice Brennan argued that adoption of the proposal would constitute "a fundamental restructuring of the federaljudiciary. "42 He observed that such a change would "rank in
importance with the creation of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in
1891,"43 and "would substantially impair [the Court's] ability to
perform the responsibilities conferred [upon it] by the Constitution."" The screening process, in Brennan's view, was one of
the Court's primary responsibilities and thus should not be delegated to a lower court.4 5 In fact, he considered the screening
function "vital to the effective performance of the Court's unique
mission 'to define [...]
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the
constitutional distribution of powers in our federal union.' '46
473 (1973). Recently, Brennan has again come forward by speaking at Georgetown
University and criticizing the current presidential administration's "call for judicial
restraint." See Kirp, Brennan Made Mistake of Sounding Like Meese, Asbury Park Press,
Oct. 23, 1985, at A19, col.l.
39 See Brennan, supra note 38, at 473.
40 Id. at 473-74.
41 Id. at 474.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 473.
44 ld. at 476.
45 See id. at 476-77. Mr. Justice Brennan noted that the screening process does
not compromise the other main tasks of the Court, such as reading decisions and
writing opinions on the merits. See id. He rejected the premise that the Supreme
Court is overworked and stated that "my law clerks tell me each year that the burden on the District and Circuit Courts with which they served before coming to me
is no less substantial than the burden on the Supreme Court." Id. at 476. Justice
Brennan maintained that the screening process employed by the Supreme Court
assured flexibility and gave individual Justices the opportunity to flag emergent issues through dissents to denials of writs of certiorari. See id. at 480. The creation
of a National Court of Appeals to certify the 400 most worthy cases to the Supreme
Court "would inevitably sacrifice this invaluable aid to constitutional adjudication
by denying certification in cases that might otherwise afford appropriate vehicles
for such dissents." Id. at 481.
46

Id. at 482 (quoting

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP

ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 1

(1972)).
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Rather than characterizing the screening process as little more
than a mechanical procedure, Brennan noted that it is a skill developed over a period of years by honing one's intuitive sense
regarding the cases that deserve review.4 7
Thus, in Brennan's view, the screening process is an integral
part of the responsibility of the Supreme Court, and the introduction of an intermediate National Court of Appeals would
"rent a seamless web."' 4 ' Although Justice Brennan's interest in
court management and judicial efficiency led him to support several of the reforms proposed by the Freund Commission,49 he
stands firmly against reforms that would transcend judicial efficiency or court management and affect the judicial function itself.
III.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S TENURE ON THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT

A.

An Overview

Justice Brennan's career on the Supreme Court encompasses
several distinct periods.50 During his first five years on the Court,
he established himself as an intellectual leader and as a craftsman, becoming the "spokesman for a slowly emerging nationalistic coalition in favor of individual civil rights and of a meaningful
national corpus juris. "'' 5 At the same time, he was widely heralded as a successful "bridge builder," disregarding absolutes
and doctrinaire posturing in order to encourage the Court to
adopt creative resolutions to complex problems.5 2
For example, shortly afterjoining the Court,Justice Brennan
authored the opinion inJencks v. United States.5" That case established the right of a criminal defendant to inspect documents re47 Id. at 478.
48 Id. at 484; see also Brennan Scoffs at Retirement as He Nears 80, Star-Ledger, Apr.

19, 1986, at 3, col. 1 (despite exhausting workload, Justice Brennan continues to
oppose National Appeals Court).

49 Brennan, supra note 38, at 474. For example, Justice Brennan supported the
proposal that the two separate methods of access to Supreme Court review-certiorari and appeal-be abolished. Id.
One might speculate as to justice Brennan's view of the administrative reforms
implemented by ChiefJustice Robert N. Wilentz in our own New Jersey court system. Although the reforms have been criticized by some practicing attorneys and
judges as burdensome, Justice Brennan's inquiry would likely focus on whether the
new procedures enhance or diminish the constitutional responsibilities of the New
Jersey court system.
50 Gibbons, Tribute tojustice Brennan, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 729, 732 (1984).
51 Id.
52 Id.

53 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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lied upon by the Government in Federal criminal prosecutions.5 4
The majority held that it was not sufficient for the trial judge to
examine documents in camera and then provide the relevant material to the defendant.5 5 Rather, the defendant himself must be
permitted to review all the documents upon which the Government intends to rely.5 6 In reaching this decision, Brennan
stressed that "the interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution'... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.' "'
This position is consistent with the views Justice Brennan expressed during his tenure on the New Jersey bench. In his first
year on the NewJersey Supreme Court, he voiced his deep suspicion of governmental secrecy in criminal proceedings in State v.
Tune,5 8 which denied pretrial discovery of an accused murderer's
own written confession. 59 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan wrote, "[i]t shocks my sense of justice that . . .counsel for
an accused facing a possible death sentence should be denied inspection of his confession which, were this a civil case, could not
be denied." ' 60 Clearly, the position expressed in this dissent provided a foundation for his later opinions while on the United
States Supreme Court. Indeed, during what has been characterized as "the 'Criminal Law Revolution' of the sixties-particularly as it affected the fairness of criminal proceedings in state
courts- ' 61 Brennan joined the majority in extending the Bill of
Rights to the states.6 2 According to Justice Brennan, "[i]t was in
63
the years from 1962 to 1969 that the face of the law changed.
The October, 1961 Term began this period, which Judge
John Gibbons of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has characterized as the "glory years" of Justice Brennan on the Supreme
Court.6 4 During these years, Justice Brennan addressed some of
54 Id. at 668-69.
55 Id. at 669.
56

Id.

57 Id. at 668 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).

58 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
59 Id. at 225, 98 A.2d at 892-93.
60 Id. at 231, 98 A.2d at 896.
61 Lewin, WilliamJ Brennan, in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 250 (L. Friedman ed. 1978).

62 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.

REV. 489, 493 (1977).
63 Id.
64 Gibbons, supra note 50, at 734. The leadership and activist role that Justice
Brennan assumed on the Court during these years was also consistent with his ex-

periences as a member of the New Jersey judiciary. Following the reorganization of
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the major issues facing contemporary society and led the Court
in bold, new directions. For example, Baker v. Carr,65 which held
that improper apportionment of state legislatures could properly
be addressed by the courts under the equal protection clause, 66
had a profound effect on the distribution of political power in
this country. In fact, Justice Brennan himself recently stated that
"[r]ecognition of the principle of 'one person, one vote' as a constitutional one redeems the promise of self-governance by affirming the essential dignity of every citizen in the right to equal
participation in the democratic process."' 67 Similarly, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan6 8 reaffirmed the "national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ' 69 and held that the first and fourteenth
amendments entitled the press to protection from the threat of
unfounded libel actions by public officials."' Indeed, this case
promoted spirited debate and a re-examination "of the central
meaning of the First Amendment.""y
In the criminal procedure area, the Court, under the leadership ofJustice Brennan, firmly adopted selective incorporation of
the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights. In the landmark case
of Malloy v. Hogan,y2 Justice Brennan emphatically declared that
the privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to state
criminal proceedings.73 He further held that the privilege was to
be applied according to the same standards whether in Federal or
our state court system in 1948, the New Jersey Supreme Court blazed a trail for
other courts in the area of policy-oriented decision making. See Rosen, A Bold Court
Forges Ahead, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 2. Although the NewJersey Supreme

Court on which Justice Brennan sat was not primarily a constitutionally-oriented
court, it frequently addressed major policy issues. See generally Fulda, Labor Law:
1952-1954, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 127 (1954); Glasser, Administrative Law, 7 RUTGERS
L. REV. 41 (1952); Heckel, ConstitutionalLaw, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 27 (1955); Knowlton, Criminal Law and Procedure, 8 RUTGERS L. REV. 78 (1953). Indeed, it was more
functionally similar to the United States Supreme Court than many other courts.
See Heck, The Socialization of a FreshmanJustice: The Early Years ofJustice Brennan, 10

PAC. L.J. 707, 714 (1979).
65 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
66 See id. at 237.

67 Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
Presentation at Georgetown University Text & Teaching Symposium 13 (Oct. 12,
1985) [hereinafter cited as Presentation].
68 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69 Id.

at 270.

70 See id. at 264.
71 Id. at 273. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-12, at

633-35 (1978).
72 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
73

Id. at 8.
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state proceedings."4 Indeed, Justice Brennan rejected the concept that the fourteenth amendment guarantees were " 'watereddown, subjective version[s] of the individual guarantees of the
Bill of Rights.' ""

In addition, the Supreme Court of this era closely examined
the issue of church-state separation. In School District v. Schempp, 76
for example, eight of the nine Justices held that Bible reading
and prayer in the public schools offended the first amendment's
establishment clause.7 7 Justice Brennan, however, rejected a
doctrinaire approach to the resolution of church-state issues and
indicated in a concurring opinion that the Court was not advocating governmental hostility toward religion.78 He wrote that the
decision did not mean that the Court must "declare unconstitutional every vestige, however slight, of cooperation
or accomoda79
tion between religion and government.

A later case, Shapiro v. Thompson,8" provoked a reevaluation
of the entire substantive content of the equal protection clause.
In invalidating a state's one-year residency requirement as a qualification for welfare benefits, 8 ' Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, held that although the state interest in limiting expenditures was legitimate, it was not compelling enough to "justify an
otherwise invidious classification. "82 Furthermore, the requirement was "constitutionally impermissible" because it abridged
the right of every citizen to travel freely from state to state.8 3
Justice Brennan's longstanding concern for the most needy
members of our society was also exemplified in Goldberg v. Kelly, 84
where he held that due process required a hearing prior to the
termination of welfare benefits.85 Moreover, Justice Brennan recently stated that "[r]ecognition of so-called 'new property'
rights in those receiving government entitlements affirms the essential dignity of the least fortunate among us by demanding that
74 Id. at

10.

Id. at 10-11 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
76 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
77 Id. at 225.
78 See id. at 230-304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
81 See id. at 622, 623.
82 Id. at 633.
83 See id. at 629-31.
84 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
85 Id. at 264.
75
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government treat with decency, integrity and consistency those
86
dependent on its benefits for their very survival."
Since 1971, however, Justice Brennan has increasingly found
himself urging a minority position, and for a time, his dissenting
opinions became more strident and acerbic.8 7 He has challenged
the majority to respect the commands of decency and humanity,
recalling the crucial role the judiciary traditionally has played in
responding to those commands. 88 For example, in his dissenting
opinion in Rogers v. Bellei, 89 he stated:
Since the Court this Term has already downgraded citizens
. . .having the misfortune to be illegitimate, . . . I suppose
today's decision downgrading citizens born outside the United
States should have been expected. Once again, as in James and
Labine, the Court's opinion makes evident that its holding is
90
contrary to earlier decisions.
Notwithstanding this occasional stridency, the role of the dissenter
is one that Justice Brennan has taken on with grace and responsibility. In a recent speech, he stated that "the dissent is often more
than just a plea; it safeguards the integrity of the judicial decisionmaking process by keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its decision."'" Although conceding that
"[d]issent for its own sake has no value,"Justice Brennan concluded
that he and his fellow Justices had a duty to articulate "significant
and deeply-held disagreement[s]." 9 2 Justice Brennan also sees a
more direct and active role for dissenting opinions today-that of
providing guidance for subsequent state court litigation. Referring
to the current trend "of expanding state court protection of individual liberties," Justice Brennan stated that "dissents from federal
courts may increasingly offer state courts legal theories that may be
relevant to the interpretation of their own constitutions." 9 3
B.

Continuing Influence in New Jersey

During the past decade and a half, Justice Brennan has advocated an approach to the adjudication of individual rights that
Presentation, supra note 67, at 13.
87 Judge Gibbons has characterized justice Brennan's new role as "keeper of the
[Supreme] Court's conscience." Gibbons, supra note 50, at 738.
86

88
89

Id.
401 U.S. 815 (1971).

90 Id. at 845 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

91 Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture at
Hastings College of Law 4 (Nov. 18, 1985).
92 Id. at 10.
93 Id. at 4-5.
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represents a departure from the analyses applied by the Warren
Court.9 4 Justice Brennan's new approach has directly influenced
the development of state law in New Jersey, although in a very
discreet way. In a 1977 Harvard Law Review article, Brennan
noted that during the expansion of civil rights under the leadership of the Federal courts in the 1960's, state courts neglected to
consider the protections that were guaranteed by their own constitutions.9 5 In the 1970's, however, the Burger Court appeared
to retreat from a liberal application of the Bill of Rights. Brennan thus noted with approval the trend of state courts, particularly the New Jersey Supreme Court, to look to their own
constitutions in order to secure those rights previously protected
by the Warren Court.9 6 Brennan further suggested that state
constitutions be used to continue the work of the Warren Court.
He urged state and lower Federal courts to base their rulings on
state constitutions in order to achieve a more liberal result than
would be achieved under the Burger Court's interpretation of the
Federal Constitution.9 7
Shortly before writing his Harvard Law Review article, Justice
Brennan dissented from the Supreme Court's decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,9 8 which upheld a
Texas public school financing system that was directly tied to real
estate values in the local school districts. 9 9 Thus, parents in
school districts with low real estate values could expect less revenue to be spent on their children's education on a per pupil basis
than was spent on the education of children in districts with
higher assessed valuations.' 0 0 Despite an equal protection challenge based on the dual premises that poverty was a suspect classification and that education was a fundamental right,' 0 ' the
United States Supreme Court approved the Texas system of
school financing. 0 2 The majority rejected the argument that
94 During his years of practice in New Jersey and his service in the New Jersey
court system, Justice Brennan remained cognizant of federalism and of the prominent role played by the states before the Warren Court expanded Federal constitutional rights. See Brennan, supra note 62, at 490.
95

96
97

Id. at 495.
Id. at 495, 499.

Id. at 491.

98 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
99 Id. at 54-55.
100 See id. at 46-47.
101 See id. at 18.
102

Id. at 50-51. The Court stated:
While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for
school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expend-
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wealth was a suspect classification. 0 3 It also rejected the contention that education was a fundamental right, reasoning that such
a right was not textually explicit in the Federal Constitution.'0 4
Justice Brennan dissented on several grounds. 10 5 He wrote that
because education was so clearly linked to the political process
and to free speech, it was a fundamental right. 0 6 Consequently,
he believed a system that penalized those in poorer school districts should be scrutinized strictly by the Court. 10 7
At the same time, the New Jersey Supreme Court was grappling with a similar issue concerning school financing, and while
Chief Justice Weintraub was drafting his opinion in Robinson v.
Cahill,' the Rodriguez opinion was published. The New Jersey
court chose not to follow the result in Rodriguez and relied instead
on the state's own constitution.' 9 By relying on the New Jersey
Constitution, the New Jersey Supreme Court thus began developing a constitutional analysis parallel to that subsequently articulated by Justice Brennan in his 1977 article." 0
A similar development occurred in the area of first amendment rights. In the 1960's, the Warren Court balanced the right
of free speech against the rights of owners of private property
open to public use and tipped the scale in favor of first amendment values."' The Burger Court later retreated from this
itures for some districts than for others, the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone
a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.
Id. (footnote omitted).
103 Id. at 27, 28. The Court stated that
[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none
of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the [poor are] not saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.
Id. at 28.
104
105
106
107

Id. at 35.

See id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
108 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, modified, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973).
109 Id. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282. Chief Justice Weintraub stated that in terms of
equal protection guarantees, "a State Constitution could be more demanding." Id.
The court based its holding, however, on the right to a "thorough and efficient"
public education. Id. at 508-09, 303 A.2d at 292-93.
110 For a discussion of Justice Brennan's article on the use of state constitutions,
see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
111 See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
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stance and held that the first amendment did not always apply to
privately-owned property such as shopping centers. 112 In
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 1 13 however, the Court took yet
a different approach. It upheld the exercise of free speech rights
on private property based upon California law. 1 4 Justice Rehnquist's opinion clearly recognized that a state's own laws may furnish an independent basis for protecting individual liberties not
shielded by the Federal Constitution.'
Soon thereafter, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on
Justice Brennan's article and on Robinson v. Cahill in an opinion
dealing with a similar first amendment issue." 6 In connection
with an upcoming Newark mayoral election, Chris Schmid, a
member of the American Labor Party, had distributed campaign
materials on the Princeton University campus. 17 Because
Schmid had entered the campus without permission, he was arrested for trespassing.' " The court in State v. Schmid"

9

indicated

that Princeton could have excluded Schmid and the other campaign workers from the campus under Federal constitutional
standards because alternative means of communication were
readily available. 120 Justice Handler noted, however, that the
provisions of the New Jersey Constitution with respect to freedom of speech are much broader than those found in its Federal
counterpart. 12

According to the Schmid court, the New Jersey

Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (peaceful picketing in shopping mall protected by first
amendment).
112 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (first amendment allows shopping mall owner to prohibit distribution of handbills unrelated to mall's operation);
see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (overruling Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968)).
113 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
114 Id. at 81.
115 Id. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[the Court's] reasoning in Lloyd ... does
not expropriovigore limit the authority of the State to exercise ... its
sovereign right
to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Id.
116 See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
'17 Id. at 538-39, 423 A.2d at 616.
118 Id. at 541, 423 A.2d at 618. Members of the Labor Party had previously requested permission to distribute leaflets on the campus. Id. at 539, 423 A.2d at
617. The University had refused to allow such distribution, however. Id.
119 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissedsub nom. Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
120 Id. at 551, 423 A.2d at 623. These alternative means of communication included a nearby train station and a street that bisected the Princeton campus. Id.
121 Id. at 557, 423 A.2d at 626-27. The court noted that the New Jersey tradition
of free political expression " 'allow[s] the widest room for discussion [and] the nar-
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Constitution provided "a wellspring of individual rights and liberties, '"122 even to the extent of subjecting private property to
23
public need when the constitution permits.1
Perhaps the greatest divergence between the United States
Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court exists in the
area of criminal procedure. In his Harvard Law Review article,
Justice Brennan noted with approval decisions of the New Jersey
Supreme Court that had departed from the prevailing Federal
construction of the procedural rights of criminals and had
achieved a different result based upon the New Jersey State Constitution. 124 A later criminal case, State v. Hunt, 1 25 presented perhaps the most searching analysis of New Jersey constitutional
jurisprudence. In Hunt, several members of the state supreme
court not only invoked Brennan's article and the principles embodied in Robinson v. Cahill, but also reflected on what standards
ought to be used when departing from the minimal Federal
26
protections. 1
The defendants in Hunt were bookmakers who asserted a
constitutionally protected interest in telephone toll billing
records.' 2 7 The New Jersey court departed from the United
States Supreme Court, which would constitutionally protect only
the telephone conversations themselves, 12 8 and prospectively
held that criminal defendants have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their telephone bills.1 29 In his concurrence, Justice
Handler quoted Justice Brennan's observation that state courts,
rowest range for its restriction.' " Id. at 558, 423 A.2d at 627 (quoting State v.
Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 412, 416 A.2d 821, 826 (1980)).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 562, 423 A.2d at 629. The court stated that "[s]ince it is our State
Constitution which we are here expounding, it is also fitting that we look to our
own strong traditions which prize the exercise of individual rights and stress the
societal obligations that are concomitant to a public enjoyment of private property." Id., 423 A.2d at 629-30. At the time Schmid sought to campaign, Princeton
University's regulations for dissemination of political materials required that permission be obtained beforehand. Id. at 539, 423 A.2d at 617. Therefore, the court
concluded that Princeton had unconstitutionally impaired Schmid's New Jersey
rights of freedom of speech and assembly and invalidated Schmid's conviction for
trespassing. Id. at 569, 423 A.2d at 633.
124 Brennan, supra note 62, at 499-500.
125 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
126 See, e.g., id. at 344-46, 450 A.2d at 955 (Justice Schreiber's majority opinion);
id. at 353-58, 450 A.2d at 959-62 (Pashman,J., concurring); id. at 358-68, 450 A.2d
at 962-67 (Handler, J., concurring).
127 See id. at 340-41, 450 A.2d at 952-53.
128 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979).
129 Hunt, 91 N.J. at 348, 450 A.2d at 956-57.
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rather than Federal courts, should ultimately resolve the vast majority of important constitutional issues. 130 Justice Brennan has
thus evoked a strong response from the New Jersey Supreme
Court to his call for state constitutional protection of individual
rights. As a result, New Jersey has begun to develop a sophisticated body of state constitutional law.
C. Justice Brennan's Influence on the Current Court

In recent years, a new and increasingly vigorous phase of
Justice Brennan's Supreme Court career has emerged-a return
to his original role of bridge builder, political strategist, and
leader. For example, he was instrumental in developing the intermediate standard of review in equal protection analysis. The
new standard provides a middle ground between the strict and
rational basis tests previously developed by the Warren Court.
His leadership on the Court is best exemplified, however, by the
recent line of cases dealing with federalism. Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently adopted Justice Brennan's view that the
tenth amendment does not limit the power of the Federal Government to enact legislation pursuant to the commerce clause.
1. Equal Protection Analysis
When Justice Brennan joined the Court in 1956, Justice
Warren was, and continued to be, the political leader. Justice
Brennan, however, has since come to be recognized as the intellectual leader of the Court. 3 ' This is particularly true in the area
of equal protection analysis, where he has demonstrated both intellectual leadership and an ability to reconcile divergent views.
Although Justice Brennan joined the Court after its
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,132 he exerted a
great deal of influence over the subsequent development of equal
protection clause jurisprudence. During Justice Brennan's ten130 Id. at 361, 450 A.2d at 963 (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting Brennan, Introduction: Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Mountain, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. xii, Xii
(1979)).
131 See Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief: Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 922, 923 (1983).
132 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown marked the modern origin of the defense of individual rights through the equal protection clause. In Brown, the Court invalidated
the "separate but equal" doctrine approved by it in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896). See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. The Brown case subsequently provoked
an extensive reexamination of the substantive content of the equal protection
clause. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
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ure, the Court developed a two-tiered analysis for1 3equal protection claims. If a suspect classification such as race,

and in some instances illegitimacy
mental right such as privacy,

136

35

1

alienage, 134

were involved, or if a funda-

interstate travel, 137 or the right to

vote 13 were involved, the Court demanded that the state show a
compelling need for its action in order to satisfy a "strict scrutiny" test. 139 In other cases, such as those involving economic or
social legislation, the Court required only a rational relationship
between a valid state purpose and the state's chosen course of
0
action. 14

While Justice Brennan contributed to the development of
these new standards, his most significant, and in some respects
most successful, contribution to equal protection analysis
evolved in the area of gender-based classifications. Prior to
1971, the Court upheld all Federal and state legislation challenged as discriminatory on the basis of sex."' It sustained state
legislation barring women from practicing law, 14 2 limiting the
number of hours a woman could work, 14 3 and
restricting the op14 4
portunities for women to serve on juries.
133 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
134 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 375 (1971).
135 See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). During this period, Justice
Brennan urged, with less success, that classifications such as those based on wealth
should also be deemed suspect. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 388-89
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
136 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
137 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969).
138 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964).
139 L. TRIBE, supra note 71, §§ 16-6 to -7. Because application of this test almost
invariably results in invalidation of the challenged state action, it has been characterized as "fatal in fact." Id.; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
140 L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 16-2. In this area, the Court was reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of elected officials. See Note, supra note 132, at 1087.
Consequently, the Court allowed wide latitude to state legislatures, and virtually
every equal protection challenge to economic regulation failed. Id.
141 See Barnard, The Conflict Between State Protective Legislation and Federal Laws
ProhibitingSex Discrimination: Is It Resolved, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 25 (1971); Gilbertson,
Women and the Equal Protection Clause, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351 (1971); Kanowitz,
ConstitutionalAspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 131
(1968); Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 262 (1970).
142 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
143 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
144 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). The earlier case of Goesaert v. Cleary,
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In 1971, however, the Court departed from its prior practice
145
of applying only minimum scrutiny to sex-based classifications.
In Reed v. Reed, 14 6 the Court unanimously struck down as arbitrary an Idaho law that gave preference to a male heir for purposes of estate administration in cases where both male and
female heirs were otherwise equally qualified. 147 The State of
Idaho sought to justify its mandatory preference scheme essentially upon the basis of administrative convenience."48 Nevertheless, the Court found that the gender classification created by the
Idaho statute represented "the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause."'' 49 While not
specifically articulating an intermediate standard of review, the
Court applied a test that can be characterized as rational basis
with a bite. 50 Thus, by focusing upon the arbitrary nature of the
Idaho preference, the Court avoided adding gender to the category of suspect classifications.
Two years after Reed, however, the Court once again attempted to determine the appropriate standard to be applied
when evaluating a gender classification.' 5 ' In Frontierov. Richardson, 15 2 the challenged Federal statute provided increased benefits
to all wives of male service personnel, while husbands of female
service personnel could qualify for such benefits only upon proof
that the wife in fact provided over one-half of the husband's support.' 5 In a plurality opinion, Justice Brennan took a broad ap335 U.S. 464 (1948), evidenced the degree ofjudicial deference given to sex-based
classifications. Upholding a law that restricted the right of women to work as bartenders, Justice Frankfurter stated: "Since the line [the legislators] have drawn is
not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real
impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try
to monopolize the calling." Id. at 467.
145 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
146 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
147 Id. at 76-77.
148 See id. at 76.
149 Id. The Court relied upon F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920). See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. Royster held that a "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster, 253 U.S. at 415.
150 See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. ChiefJustice Burger stated that a sex-based classification must "[bear] a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be
advanced by the operation of [the statute at issue]." Id.; see Gunther, supra note 139,
at 20, 36.
151 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1973) (Brennan,J., plurality opinion).
152 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
153 Id. at 678-79 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
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proach and held that any classification based upon sex was
suspect and required the highest standard of review-strict scrutiny.' 5 4 He noted that partly because of the distinctive nature of
sexual characteristics, women still faced pervasive discrimination
in educational institutions, in the labor force, and in the political
arena. 5 5 He commented that
what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized
suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a
result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the
effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to
inferior legal status without
regard to the actual capabilities of
56
its individual members.'
Despite Justice Brennan's opinion in Frontiero, the Court later
retreated from applying the strict scrutiny standard to cases that
clearly involved gender-based classifications, particularly in evaluating so-called benign or compensatory legislation. 15 7 Nonetheless,
Justice Brennan held firm to his conviction that sex was a suspect
classification requiring strict scrutiny by the Court regardless of
whether women were benefited or disadvantaged.' 5 8 Thus, in Kahn
v. Shevin, 1 59 when the Court upheld a Florida statute granting widows but not widowers a property tax exemption,1 60 Justice Brennan
dissented.' 6 ' Although he agreed that the Florida statute neither
stigmatized nor denigrated widowers who were denied the exemption, 1 62 Justice Brennan nonetheless urged that according to FronId. at 688 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
156 Id. at 686-87 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). Although
they concurred in the result, Justices Powell, Burger, and Blackmun departed from
Justice Brennan's analysis, finding it unnecessary to deem gender a suspect classification. Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring). They also urged that the Court await
the outcome of the equal rights amendment, which was then pending. Id. at 692
(Powell,J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He adopted the reasoning of the district court that the statute satisfied
the Reed test because it was a rational means to a legitimate legislative end-administrative convenience in the disbursement of dependency benefits. Id.; see Frontiero
v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 207 (M.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Frontiero v. Rich154
155

ardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
See infra notes 159-181 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
160 Id. at 352.
161 See id. at 357-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157
158
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tiero, sex was a suspect classification. 16 ' The legislation was
therefore subject to strict scrutiny whether the class benefited was
male or female. 16 4 He noted that the statute was "plainly overinclusive, for the $500 property tax exemption may be obtained by a financially independent heiress as well as by an unemployed widow
with dependent children." 165 Notwithstanding its legitimate interest in "alleviating the effects of past economic discrimination against
women," 166 Brennan argued that "the State has not borne its burden of proving that its compelling interest could not be achieved by
a more precisely
tailored statute or by the use of feasible, less drastic
67
means." 1

justice Brennan also dissented in Schlesinger v. Ballard,168 where
the Court was faced with a challenge to a Federal statute subjecting
a male navy officer who twice failed to be selected for promotion to
mandatory discharge regardless of the length of time he had been in
active service.161 Under a different statute, a female officer was subject to mandatory discharge only after thirteen years of active service without promotion. 171 In upholding the regulation, the Court
first observed that because female officers were not assigned to combat duty and thus had less opportunity for advancement than male
officers, the two groups were not similarly situated. 7 1 The Court
thus viewed the classification as compensatory rather than discriminatory.172 The majority observed that the "longer period of tenure
for women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to
provide women officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement
programs.' "173 Justice Brennan again argued that because a gender
classification was involved, the scheme must be examined under the
strict scrutiny standard. 174 He also noted that the legislative history
failed to demonstrate a compensatory purpose with regard to female officers. 17 5 On the contrary, in Brennan's view "the legislative
history [was] replete with indications of a decision not to give women
163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

168

419 U.S. 498 (1975).

Id. at 499 & n.1.
Id. at 499-500 & n.2.
171 Id. at 508.
169
170

172 See id.
173 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967)).

174
175

Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 17 7 Brennan dissented from the

Court's application of a mere rational basis test to the statutory exclusion of pregnancy benefits from California's disability insurance
scheme. 17 8 The majority maintained that the statute involved not a
gender-based classification, but a distinction between pregnant and
nonpregnant persons. 1 79 In his dissent, Brennan stated that "by
singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability
peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard for disability compensation. .

.

. Such dissimilar treatment of men and wo-

men, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to
1 80
one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination."
Because it had become apparent that a majority of the Court
would not accept sex as a suspect classification, Justice Brennan
took a different approach in 1975 when faced with the task of writing the opinion for the Court in a case involving a gender-based
classification. 18 1 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld"8 involved a provision of
the Social Security Act that provided survivors' benefits to widows
having minor children in their care.' 8 3 In the case of a widower with
minor children, however, such benefits were provided only to the
184
children and not to the widower.
The Court invalidated the statute because its distinction between men and women was indistinguishable from the legislative
scheme disapproved in Frontiero.'85 Justice Brennan observed that
both provisions assumed that the earnings of male workers were vital to a family while those of a female were not. 186 Rather than regarding the statute as discrimination against widowers, however,
Justice Brennan viewed the scheme as "denigrat[ing] . . . the efforts
of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly
to their families' support."'' 8 7 He noted that the deceased wife "not
only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received, but she also was
Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
178 See id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 496 n.20.
180 Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
182 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
183 Id. at 637.
184 Id. at 637-38.
185 Id. at 642-43.
186 Id. at 643.
187 Id. at 645.
176
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deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to
the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others."' 8 8 In order
to gain a consensus, Brennan carefully crafted his opinion and refrained from articulating the conclusion that sex was a suspect classification. While not abandoning his prior position, he built on the
entire body of precedent and cited both Reed and Frontiero.'8 9
Wiesenfeld highlighted the need for a higher standard of review
in cases involving quasi-suspect classifications. In 1976, Justice
Brennan responded to this need and developed a new standard for
equal protection analysis in cases of gender-based discrimination.' 9
Justice Brennan's new rule reflected a consensus of the various Justices' differing views.' 9 ' In Craig v. Boren, 9 2 an Oklahoma statute
that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to females under the age of
eighteen and males under the age of twenty-one was declared unconstitutional on the ground that the gender classification impermissibly denied equal protection to males between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one.19 3 Justice Brennan declared that "[t]o
withstand a Constitutional challenge,.

classifications by gender

must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' 9 4
Justice Brennan noted that both Reed and Frontiero had rejected
administrative convenience as a sufficiently important governmental
objective to justify gender-based distinctions. 19 5 He distinguished
Craig from Kahn and Ballard,which had upheld gender classifications
designed to remedy past discrimination in economic and military
contexts.' 9 6 Although the Court agreed that public health and traffic
safety were important governmental concerns, it determined that
the statistics relied upon by Oklahoma did not support the conclusion that the gender-based classification was substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.' 9 7 The Court thus concluded
that under Reed, the statute could not withstand an equal protection
188

Id.

See id. at 642-53.
190 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
191 Prior to this time, the Court had used "a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
193 See id. at 204.
194 Id. at 197.
195 Id.at 198.
196 Id. at 198 n.6.
197 Id. at 199-200.
189
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challenge.'
In the cases immediately following Craig, the Court successfully
employed the intermediate standard of review and invalidated gender-based legislation that burdened economic rights or reinforced
20 0
sexual discrimination.' 9 9 For instance, in Califano v. Goldfarb, Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, invalidated a provision of the Social Security Act under which a widow was entitled to
survivors' benefits based on the earnings of her deceased husband,
but a widower was eligible for benefits only if he had received at
least one-half of his support from his deceased spouse.2 ° ' Justice
Brennan viewed the system as discrimination against covered, wageearning women who received less protection for their spouses than
similarly situated men.20 2 He concluded that
[t]he only conceivable justification for writing the presumption
of wives' dependency into the statute is . . . based simply on
"archaic and overbroad" generalizations . . . that it would

save the Government time, money, and effort simply to pay
benefits to all widows, rather than to require proof of dependency of both sexes. .

.

. [S]uch assumptions do not suffice to

justify a gender-based discrimination in the distribution of employment-related benefits.20 3
Similarly, in Orr v. Orr, 20 4 the Court invalidated a state statute
that permitted alimony for wives but not for husbands.20 5 Once
again, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority. 20 6 He rejected the
proffered state objective of allocating primary responsibility for the
family to the husband. 20 7 Brennan identified two possible objectives that might be considered sufficiently important to support a
198 Id. at 200. Justice Rehnquist's dissent, however, questioned the validity of the
substantial relation test:
How is this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to
determine whether a particular law is "substantially" related to the
achievement of such objective, rather than related in some other way to
its achievement? Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic
as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation ...
Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977).
200 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
201 Id. at 201-02 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
202 See id. at 206-07 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
203 Id. at 217 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
204 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
205 Id. at 270-71.
206 Id. at 270.
207 Id. at 279-80.
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gender-based classification: (1) providing help for needy spouses,
and (2) atoning for past economic discrimination. 2 8 He determined
that the statute under consideration in Orr promoted neither objective. 2 0 9 Because Alabama had a procedure for examining the financial circumstances of each party prior to entry of an alimony order,
Justice Brennan concluded that the statute, rather than promoting
administrative convenience, actually furthered sexual discrimination
and was therefore unconstitutional.2 10
In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 2 1 1 however, Brennan once
again assumed the role of dissenter.21 2 The majority used a twopronged inquiry in its assessment of a statute that was concededly
gender-neutral on its face. 2 13 Because it gave preference to veterans over nonveterans in employment, the Court determined that the
statute did not discriminate on the basis of gender. 2 4 Nevertheless,
Justices Marshall and Brennan argued that the absolute veterans'
preference system evinced purposeful, gender-based discrimination
by "render[ing] desirable state civil service employment an almost
exclusively male prerogative.- 21 5 They applied the intermediate
standard and argued that because the statutory scheme did not bear
a substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental objective, it
violated the equal protection clause.21 6
Justice Brennan again joined the dissent in Rostker v. Goldberg,2 7
where the Court held that the Selective Service Act, which required
draft registration of males but not females, did not violate the fifth
amendment. 2 18 Because Congress had banned combat duty for women, the majority concluded that men and women were not similarly situated in terms of draft registration. 21 9 The majority further
held that because the purpose of the draft was "to develop a pool of
potential combat troops," Congress reasonably had exempted wo208
209
210

Id. at 280.
Id. at 281-82.
See id. at 281-83.

211

442 U.S. 256 (1979).

See id. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined injustice Marshall's dissent. Id.
213 See id. at 274.
214 Id. at 274-75. The plaintiff argued that 98% of veterans were male and that
the statute thus impacted adversely on the public employment opportunities of women. See id. at 270-71. Nonetheless, the Court held that the state law did not reflect invidious discrimination. Id. at 280-81.
215 Id. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 286 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
218 Id. at 83.
219 Id. at 78.
212
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men from the draft. 2 2' The dissent took issue with the majority's
view of the legislative purpose.22 It argued that the gender distinction constituted mere stereotyping and was not substantially calculated to further the governmental objective of raising armies.2 2 2
Further, the dissenters emphasized that the Court, not Congress,
should determine "whether there exists the constitutionally required 'close and substantial relationship' between the discrimina22 3
tory means employed and the asserted governmental objective.Justice Brennan returned to the majority in Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan.22 4 By a narrow five-to-four vote, the Court sustained an equal protection challenge brought by an otherwise qualified male nursing school applicant who was denied admission to the
University because of his sex. 22 5 The state attempted to justify its
gender preference by claiming that it compensated women for past
discrimination in higher education. 2 26 The Court noted, however,
that the labor force in fact reflected a predominance of females in
the nursing field. 22 7 Instead of compensating for past discrimination, the University's "policy of excluding males from admission to
the School of Nursing tend[ed] to perpetuate
the stereotyped view
22 8
of nursing as an exclusively woman's job.
The "intermediate tier" standard of review first articulated by
Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren thus continues to be used by the
Court in several contexts. In the gender classification area, however, Brennan has been less than satisfied with the results. Applying
the very test he crafted, the Court has upheld classifications based
upon sex, placingJustice Brennan once again in the minority. Ironically, after forging a coalition in this area, Justice Brennan once
again finds himself in the position of the dissenter.
2.

Federalism

In contrast to its application of his gender discrimination
theory, the Court reaffirmed justice Brennan's view of the proper
balance of power between the states and the Federal Govern220
221

Id. at 79.
See id. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

222

See id. at 86, 111 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

223

227

Id. at 89-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
See id. at 720-21, 723.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 729.

228

Id. (footnote omitted).
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ment in our federalist system last Term.229 Justice Brennan has
consistently taken the position that the tenth amendment does
not affirmatively limit Federal power in the economic and social
spheres. 23 0 Although the source of Federal power has been hotly
debated over the years, 23 ' Justice Brennan has relied on the fourteenth amendment to uphold the National Government's predominance in these areas.
For example, in the landmark case of Katzenbach v. Morgan,2 3 2
the Court struck down a state statute that required literacy in
English as a prerequisite for voting in New York because it conflicted with the Federal Voting Rights Act, which proscribed the
use of such tests.233 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
equated congressional power under section five of the fourteenth
amendment to the powers contained in the necessary and proper
clause, 234 which had been interpreted expansively by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.235 Brennan described section five as "a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees
' 23 6
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The dissent in Morgan argued that if Congress was permitted
to expand and interpret the equal protection clause, it might similarly contract the protections of that clause.237 Justice Brennan
replied:
We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
229

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1021

(1985).

230 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862, 875 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
231 See, e.g., Discriminationin Public Accomodations Affecting Interstate Commerce: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-71
(1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, United States Attorney General); see also
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 upheld
on basis of commerce clause); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)
(commerce clause permits Federal regulation of interstate movement of goods

deemed injurious to public welfare). See generally G.

GUNTHER, CONSrITuIONAL

LAw 160 (11th ed. 1985).

384 U.S. 641 (1966).
See id. at 646-47.
Id. at 650.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (necessary
and proper clause).
236 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
237 Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
232
233
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dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the State to establish racially segregated systems of
education would not be-as required by § 5-a measure "to
since that clause of its
enforce" the Equal Protection Clause
238
own force prohibits such state laws.
According to Justice Brennan, the Court was prohibited from reviewing Congress's resolution of the conflicting considerations involved in the legislation. 2 9 He stated that the Court need only
"perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."12 40 Thus, if the measure at issue is determined to be
an appropriate enforcement of the commands of the fourteenth
amendment, it is within Congress's broad power under section five
to enact such legislation. 2 4 '
This theory of Federal power espoused by Justice Brennan in
Morgan was directly challenged in National League of Cities v. Usery,2 4 2
where five Justices joined to invalidate amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended wage and overtime provisions to
employees of state and local government entities. 2 43 Although the
amendments were held to be within the grant of legislative authority
contained in the commerce clause, the majority viewed the tenth
amendment as an affirmative limitation upon the exercise of that
authority.

2 44

238
239

Id. at 651 n.10.
Id. at 653.

240

Id.

See id. at 650-51.
426 U.S. 833 (1976). For a discussion of NationalLeague of Cities and its progeny, see Matsumoto, National League of Cities-FromFootnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 35; Michelman, States' Rights
and States'Roles: Permutationsof "Sovereignty "in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce
Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115 (1978).
243 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-52.
244 See id. at 842, 845. In formulating the tenth amendment principle, the majority distinguished congressional regulation of private-sector activities from regulation of state and local governmental activities. Id. at 845. Regulations affecting the
private sector were held permissible and outside the operation of the tenth amendment because individual businesses are subject to both state and Federal sovereignty. Id. In contrast, the Court held, the tenth amendment prohibits Congress
from impairing the attributes of state sovereignty by enacting legislation aimed at
regulating certain state and local government activities. Id. Thus, Federal legislation that "directly displace[d] the States' freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions" was prohibited by the tenth amendment. Id. at 852. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, who supplied the
majority's fifth vote, indicated that legislation that was otherwise invalid under the
majority's test would be permissible "where the federal interest is demonstrably
greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would
be essential." Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
241
242
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Justice Brennan's scholarly and forceful dissenting opinion disagreed with the very premise upon which the majority based its position. 24 ' He observed at the outset that all of the Justices agreed
that Congress had enacted the 1974 amendments pursuant to its
plenary power "'[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.' "246 Though laws enacted under the commerce power may
not infringe on individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights,
Justice Brennan argued that "there is no restraint based on state
sovereignty. . . anywhere. . . in the Constitution" that would prevent Congress from functioning in accordance with its delegated
powers. 2 1 7 He found the majority's "ill-conceived abstraction" to
be "a transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment
with which they disagree. ' 24 8 He further chided the Court for failing to exercise judicial restraint, noting that "[ilt is unacceptable
that the judicial process should be thought superior to the political
249
process in this area."-

Justice Brennan also pointed out that the states are fully able to
protect their own interests by exercising their political power
through their representatives in Congress.

2 50

He observed that the

nature of the political system of representation insures that Congress will be mindful of the states' concerns.2 5 ' In a particularly
245 See id. at 856-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan traced the history
of Supreme Court decisions that defined the scope of Congress's power under the
commerce clause. Id. at 857-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted that the Court
had consistently reaffirmed the view of ChiefJustice John Marshall "that restraints
upon exercise by Congress of its plenary commerce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial process." Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 856-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
247 Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan analogized the majority's
restrictive view of Federal power to the view that prevailed during the Great Depression. Id. at 868 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The Court's invalidation of New Deal
legislation prompted President Roosevelt to propose his Court-packing plan. See
id. According to Justice Brennan, the Court's abandonment of an overly restrictive
construction of the commerce power led to defeat of the Court-packing plan. Id.
He noted, however, that even the dissenters in the New Deal era cases had failed to
draw a distinction between the states and private parties because "in their view,
what was not commerce for one was commerce for no one." Id. at 869 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
249 Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 877-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251 See id. at 877 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan then pointed to the
Federal budget as an illustration of the states' political powers. Id. at 878 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted that substantial Federal assistance is available to the
States for meeting costs in such areas as fire and police protection and summer
youth programs. See id. He concluded that "this demonstrated ability to obtain
funds from the Federal Government for needed State services [establishes] that the

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN

1986]

457

provocative comment, illustrative of the bitter dissents that characterized this period, Justice Brennan implied that the Court was not
equally solicitous of the concerns of the individual whose political
voice was not as strong as that of the states.2 5 2 To the contrary, he
wrote, the Court "frequently remand[s] powerless individuals to the
political process by invoking doctrines of standing, justiciability, and
remedies," while "those entities with perhaps the greatest representation in the political process" are welcomed by a Court that "embraces their political cause, and overrides Congress' political
decision."

2 53

Soon after National League of Cities was decided, a unanimous
Court held in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association 2 54 that the tenth amendment does not limit congressional power
to preempt or displace state regulation of coal mining, a private activity.25 5 Although Justice Brennan did not write the majority opinion in Hodel, it clearly incorporated the views expressed in his
National League of Cities dissent.2 5 6 Even where Federal legislation
might be impermissible under the National League of Cities test, the
Court stated, the legislation will not necessarily fall if the Federal
interest outweighs the competing state interest. 257 Thus, the Hodel
Court limited the scope of the holding in National League of Cities by
concluding that when an activity affects interstate commerce, the
courts need only determine whether Congress could have had a rational basis for enacting the challenged statute.2 5 8
In National League of Cities, Justice Brennan also asked, "Can the
States engage in businesses competing with the private sector and
then come to the courts arguing that withdrawing the employees of
those businesses from the private sector evades the power of the
federal government to regulate commerce? ' 25 9 His question was
answered in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road,2 6 °
where a unanimous Court noted that "there is no justification for a
rule which would allow the states, by acquiring functions previously
performed by the private sector, to erode federal authority in areas
States' influence in the political process is adequate to safeguard their sovereignty." Id. at 878 (footnote omitted).
252 See id. at 878 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 878-79 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
254 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
255 Id. at 290-91.
256 See id. at 283-93.
257 Id. at 288 n.29.
258
259

See id. at 291.

260

455 U.S. 678 (1982).

National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation. "261 The Court
therefore held the challenged Railway Labor Act constitutional because it was within congressional authority to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry, and because the statute did not
directly diminish the states' "ability 'to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions.' "262
The Court continued to erode the National League of Cities rationale in FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi.263 In that
case, a sharply divided Court determined not only that regulation 2 of
64
public utilities was within Congress's commerce clause power,
but also that Congress was free to preempt the field of energy regulation entirely.26 5 Justice Brennan joined the majority opinion,
which held that Congress could also espouse "a less intrusive
scheme" and afford a limited regulatory role to the states.2 6 6 The
Court concluded that "because the

.

.

.

challenged [statute] simply

condition[ed] continued state involvement in a pre-emptible area on
the consideration of federal proposals, [it did] not threaten the
States' 'separate and independent existence.' "267
Justice Brennan contributed to the further erosion of National
League of Cities in EEOC v. Wyoming.2 68 In that case, the Court upheld,
by a five-to-four vote, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA) as it applied to state and local governments.2 6 9 Specifically, the Court held that state-employed game wardens were
protected by the ADEA's provision prohibiting age discrimination. 270 Justice Brennan's majority opinion noted that because the
Act was clearly within Congress's commerce clause power, it was unnecessary to decide whether the statute could also be upheld under
section five of the fourteenth amendment. 2 7 ' Applying the National
League of Cities test, the Court found that the ADEA did not " 'directly impair' the State's ability to 'structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions'- 272 because Wyoming
Id. at 687.
Id. at 684-85 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
456 U.S. 742 (1982).
Id. at 757.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 765. The majority viewed Congress's regulatory scheme as a plan of
"cooperative federalism," which would enable the states to administer their own
programs in order to meet particular local needs. Id. at 767.
267 Id. at 765 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
268 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
269 Id. at 243.
270 Id. at 238-39.
271 Id. at 243.
272 Id. at 239.
261
262
263
264
265
266
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could meet its goal of assuring the physical preparedness of its game
wardens in ways other than through a blanket mandatory retirement
age.2 73 Justice Brennan distinguished NationalLeague of Cities by stating that the ADEA would not
have "a direct or an obvious negative
27 4
effect on state finances.275
Finally, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the Court overruled National League of Cities2 76 and explicitly
adopted justice Brennan's view of federalism. Garcia held that Congress violated no affirmative limitation on its commerce power by
extending the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to metropolitan transit employees.2 7 7
Justice Blackmun, who had cast the swing vote in National League of
Cities, wrote the opinion, which reiterated and built on Justice Brennan's earlier observations concerning the nature of our political system. 2 7 8 He found the "traditional governmental functions" prong
of the National League of Cities test to be unworkable and inconsistent
with established principles of federalism. 2 79 The Court held that
the states' continued role in the federal system is guaranteed not by
limits on the commerce clause power, but by the structure of the
Federal Government itself: "[T]he principal and basic limit on the
federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state
participation in federal governmental action. The political process
ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated."2 ' Thus, at least for the moment, Justice Brennan's view of
our political system prevails. 281
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite an unprecedented forty-one dissenting votes during
the 1985 Term, Justice Brennan's views with respect to some of
the country's most important and highly-publicized issues, such
273

Id.
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275
276

Id. at 241.
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278

Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
See id. at 1010-16.

279
280

Id. at 1016.

105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
Id. at 1021. See generally Lynch, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority: An Alternate Opinion, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 74 (1986).

Id. at 1020.

Compare id. (Garcia majority's view of federalism) with National League of Cities,
426 U.S. at 876-78 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan's view of our political
system). For a recognition that the NationalLeague of Cities rationale may someday
be revived, see Lynch, supra note 276, at 75.
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as church-state relations and federalism, guided the Court in its
attempts to apply the Constitution to a society whose problems
and values are constantly changing. 28 2 Justice Brennan's effectiveness on the Court is attributable not only to his intellect and
charismatic personality, but also to the negotiating skills he first
developed while a labor attorney in New Jersey.2 8 3 These traits
have led to his characterization "as the master strategist of the
Burger Court. ' 28 4 Although Justice Brennan's tenure on the
Court has not ended, history will certainly view him as a compassionate Justice, committed to individual liberties and careful of
both procedural and substantive safeguards. Indeed, he is a child
of New Jersey of whom we can all be proud.
282 See Greenhouse, Rulings of High Court's Term Reaffirm Church-State Barriers, N.Y.

Times, July 8, 1985, at B5, col. 1.
283 Serrill, The Power of William Brennan, TIME, July 22, 1985, at 62.
284 Id.

